Kudankulam Judgment – well delivered

There was a news item in today’s DNA: “No clear reason in the Kudankulam judgment” authored by Praful Bidwai. It is shocking to see that he is questioning the very judgment of the Supreme Court which we all hold in great esteem. It is a well-informed judgment.

The judgment is very well made asking the government to follow all the safety related recommendations of the Indian Regulatory Board, AERB. The plants are ready and the technology is well known. There are very few cases of fatality in nuclear industry as compared to any other industry. There are well studied and well established techniques for the management of radioactive wastes.

One should not forget that we are all exposed to natural background radiation from space, from the radioactivity present in earth and the air we breathe. This we cannot avoid. We also do not mind getting X-rayed or CT scanned for diagnosis of diseases. These procedures do result in giving radiation dose to us.

The number of deaths Mr. Bidwai claiming (Chernobyl and Fukushima) is only the estimates and not the actuals! People should not be misguided by these mathematically calculated numbers. Compared to this calculated numbers, one can see instant fatalities in natural events. For example, the recent US twister with the energy equivalent of 600 Hiroshima bombs, resulted in deaths, and mass destruction in Oklahoma, of the order of USD2 billion!

It is rightly pointed out that one has to pay a small price for the immense benefits one gets from the use of electricity. These small risks are ACCEPTABLE.

It is time that the anti-development groups, anti-nuclear group in particular, should stop playing with estimated number of fatalities in any development programmes and focus on something more productive and serve the humanity. 

Cancer risk estimates by WHO - Fukushima radioactivity releases

This has reference to the News Report (Fukushima Disaster raised Cancer Risk - WHO...) in Times of India dated March 1, 2013.

With all the due respect for the WHO and the team of experts who have done the risk estimations, it can be stated that: 

1. The releases from Fukushima are very much lower than the Chernobyl. 

2. The estimated number of cancer incidences from the Chernobyl releases, predicted using the similar line of calculations followed by WHO, never occurred and far from reality. 

3. The very concept of Linear No-Threshold (LNT) approach followed for the risk estimations is not  experimentally proved and hence should not be used for actual risk calculations. 

4. The LNT concept can only be used for general optimization of protection.  

5. The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), in its latest recommendations, clearly stated that: Risk factors for carcinogenesis calculated using LNT approach have a high degree of uncertainty. This is particularly so for the calculation of cancer risk by adding up of the calculated low levels of individual doses to the members of the public (which is a small fraction of the natural radiation dose received by all of us), in situations of environmental releases in accidents. This is exactly the situation encountered in Fukushima nuclear accident. 

6. The ICRP Recommendations (ICRP-103, page no. 313) is the backbone of Radiological Protection   world-wide, and it clearly states that the adding up of small estimated doses over large populations and calculating the cancer risk is using LNT approach is NOT A VALID PROCEDURE. 

Based on the above facts, it is not advised to give such a publicity to the news item, which will only harm the nuclear industry. 

For further reading pl see: 

http://healthcare.financialexpress.com/inimaging2011jul/inimaging2011july09.shtml  

Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, IAEA Safety Standards Series SSG-15 Subject Classification: Radioactive waste management, STI/PUB/1503, 110 pp. Language: English, Date Published: 2012.

This Safety Guide provides recommendations and guidance on the storage of spent nuclear fuel. It covers all types of storage facilities and all types of spent fuel from nuclear power plants and research reactors. It takes into consideration the longer storage periods that have become necessary owing to delays in the development of disposal facilities and the decrease in reprocessing activities. It also considers developments associated with nuclear fuel, such as higher enrichment, mixed oxide fuels and higher burn-up. Guidance is provided on all stages in the lifetime of a spent fuel storage facility, from planning through siting and design to operation and decommissioning, and in particular retrieval of spent fuel. 

Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. Roles and responsibilities; 4. Management system; 5. Safety case and safety assessment; 6. General safety considerations for storage of spent fuel. Appendix I: Specific safety considerations for wet or dry storage of spent fuel; Appendix II: Conditions for specific types of fuel and additional considerations; Annex: I: Short term and long term storage; Annex II: Operational and safety considerations for wet and dry spent fuel storage facilities; Annex III: Examples of sections in operating procedures for a spent fuel storage facility; Annex IV: Related publications in the IAEA Safety Standards Series; Annex V: Site conditions, processes and events for consideration in a safety assessment (external natural phenomena); Annex VI: Site conditions, processes and events for consideration in a safety assessment (external human induced phenomena); Annex VII: Postulated initiating events for consideration in a safety assessment (internal phenomena) (Source; www.iaea.org).

Stable iodine prophylaxis

Stable iodine prophylaxis is a protective measure of administration of stable iodine to block uptake and reduce accumulation of of radioactive iodine released in nuclear reactor accidents, in thyroid. The administration is done before, or promptly after, intake of radioactive iodine released in nuclear reactor accidents. Intake of radioactive iodine by inhalation begins when the radioactive cloud arrives at a location and continues during the passage of the cloud. Action to implement stable iodine prophylaxis, and thereby reduce the dose to the thyroid, will be required promptly. The decision will most probably have to be made in a situation when reliable data for calculating the potential dose to the thyroid are not available. 

Stable iodine could also be used as prophylaxis against ingested radioactive iodine from contaminated food. However, in such situations, the iodine prophylaxis will be required for a longer period of time, leading to a need for repeated doses. In such situations, food controls would be easier to implement and more effective in the long term in reducing the collective dose than stable iodine prophylaxis.